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Tom Betteridge
Alain Badiou’s anabasis: rereading Paul Celan against
Heidegger
The essay examines Alain Badiou’s concept of ‘anabasis’ and its disclosure
in the poetry of Paul Celan. As a conceptualisation of the process of subject
formation, anabasis is read as a rejoinder to that of ‘homecoming’, found in
Martin Heidegger’s appropriation of Friedrich Ho¨lderlin’s poems. Follow-
ing an excursus on the philosophical and the ethical stakes at the heart of
these movements, the essay close-reads two of Celan’s poems in order to
reveal poetry’s own attempts to think through trajectories of emergent sub-
jectivities in the wake of twentieth-century violence, as well as the as yet
understated centrality of Celan’s poetry to Badiou’s wider philosophical
project.
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Alain Badiou unfolds the concept ‘Anabasis’ in The Century (2005/2007)1
in a meditation upon poems by Saint-John Perse and Paul Celan. Coming
to signify the trajectory or movement comprising the essential moments
of subject formation in the wake of twentieth-century violence, the
concept of anabasis with which Badiou’s chapter ends is intended to take
account of the fact that, in Badiou’s words, ‘the century foundered upon
a darkness so real that it was forced to change the direction of [its] move-
ment, as well as the words that would articulate it’.2 Crucially, Badiou finds
the resources for thinking this change of direction in the poetry of Paul
Celan, who, for Badiou, ‘never ceased inventing a poetry capable of reck-
oning with what men underwent during the thirties and forties . . . ’3
Though ineluctably grounded in Celan’s poetics however, anabasis also
comes to resonate beyond the bounds of poetry’s own interrogation of
subject formation, and this is illuminated by Justin Clemens when he
claims that anabasis is actually fundamental to Badiou’s philosophy as a
whole, remaining consistent despite its invocation in different contexts:
‘Once you recognize this operation, you might begin to discern it every-
where in Badiou – if under a sequence of ever-varying names.’4
However, this particular rendering of an ever-present operation – ‘anaba-
sis’ in The Century – has a very specific target encoded beneath its subtle
resonances and allusions: Martin Heidegger. In what follows, I want to
read anabasis as a trajectory mobilised specifically against the movement
of ‘homecoming’ we find bound to Heidegger’s infamous readings of Frie-
drich Ho¨lderlin’s poems, in the hope that Celan’s significance to Badiou’s
departure from Heidegger be made explicit. This essay begins by exploring
the philosophical concerns – sameness, otherness, identity, alterity – at the
heart of these movements of the subject, before offering two close-readings
of Celan intended to elucidate Celan’s own engagement with homecom-
ing, as well as its centrality to the development of Badiou’s anabasis.
Opening his meditation, Badiou writes: ‘How did the century envi-
sage its own movement . . . ? As a re-ascent towards the source, an
arduous construction of novelty, an exiled experience of beginning.’5
These three moments comprise the essential aspects of anabasis per se.
Badiou starts his analysis, however, not with the twentieth century’s
‘own movement’ nor with the more particular variant of this movement
he reads from Celan, but with a return to Xenophon’s narrative Anabasis.
This return operates as a subtle allusion to Heidegger’s focused investi-
gations into the obscured etymologies of physis, logos, ale¯theia, et al., and
his attempt to revivify them as constituents of the myth of a pure Greek
arche.6 Badiou’s return to Xenophon serves as a surreptitious critique
here too, insofar as it privileges the Ancient Greeks’ military prowess,
their discipline especially, over the aesthetic, cultural and intellectual
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evolution of their ‘refined civilisation’.7 This subversion is completed when
Badiou identifies Greek military discipline as a ‘discipline of thought, the
compact force of a certainty . . . ’.8 Thought’s proximity to the poem in
Heidegger is overturned, replaced by a thinking allied to political necessity;
and this critique is lent further weight by a playfully disproportionate
analogy with the ‘iron discipline’ Lenin imposes upon his proletarian
party. As well, Badiou’s use of ‘source’ is not arbitrary, and alludes to
both Ho¨lderlin’s obsession with his two rivers – the Rhine and the Ister –
and to Heidegger’s adoption of the discourse of Ursprung and source in his
own writings on Ho¨lderlin, especially on ‘The Ister’ hymn.9 Alongside explicit
reference to Heidegger elsewhere in the chapter – to his meeting with Paul
Celan in 1967 and the subsequent publication of Celan’s ‘Todtnauberg’,
for example – these allusions invite us to consider the ‘trajectory’ central to
Heidegger’s reading of Ho¨lderlin – ‘homecoming’ – alongside anabasis.
At its most abstract, the movement of homecoming contains three
points in sequence: the traveller departs, encounters the other, and then
returns to home’s sanctuary. In this movement’s Homeric form, Odysseus
departs Ithaca for Troy, the majority of this epic poem then presents the
various trials he faces in his attempt to return to Penelope, Telemachus,
and his estate in Ithaca, where he is ensured a hero’s welcome. However,
the movement of homecoming with which we are dealing concerns funda-
mentally the becoming of cultural identity, the moving into proximity with
what is ‘proper’ to one – and in its Heideggerian form, the becoming of
the historical destiny of the German people. Reading Ho¨lderlin’s ‘The
Ister’, Heidegger remarks that the poet may only ‘learn the free use of
what is proper to him’ by fulfilling one of the conditions of ‘becoming
at home in what is proper . . . ’: ‘the voyage into the foreign land’.10 The
following year in 1943, Heidegger commemorates the hundredth anniver-
sary of Ho¨lderlin’s death with an address subsequently titled ‘Homecom-
ing/To Kindred Ones’.11 There, a sinister reminder of the sacrifice of those
‘sons of the homeland . . . far distant from its soil’ is followed by the explicit
imbrication of poetic task with the violent assertion of national identity:
‘are not these sons of the homeland the poet’s closest kin?’ The political
stakes of homecoming then, a movement which depends on pre-verified
limits and boundaries, on blood and soil, become clear: ‘homecoming’,
Heidegger surmises, ‘is the future of the historical being of the German
people’.12 The poetic task of homecoming finds its corollary then in the
political attempt to inaugurate a new people through the violent dissol-
ution of the other. In order for the same to arise, it must pass through
the other as its adversary.
Charles Bambach’s reading of Ho¨lderlin in Thinking the Poetic
Measure of Justice: Ho¨lderlin-Heidegger-Celan13 seeks to emphasise the reci-
procity between same and other evinced in Holderlin’s poems in order to
Tom Betteridge Alain Badiou’s anabasis
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open his poetry to a thought tradition entirely alien to Heidegger’s totalis-
ing narrative. Reading ‘The Ister’ and ‘The Journey’, Bambach writes that:
To be German then, for Ho¨lderlin, means to journey forth from the
provinces and to leave behind what is familiar; it means to enter into
the realm of what is foreign, strange, and other, so that what is one’s
own can be cultivated in and through an encounter with alterity.14
Bambach claims that Heidegger’s reading of Ho¨lderlin serves to obscure
this fundamental aspect of exchange with the other by emphasising what
he calls ‘the narrow myth of autochthony’, and later describes as ‘the
myth of a pure Greek arche untouched by foreign influence’.15 The becom-
ing of a people, for Ho¨lderlin, is a reciprocal process demanding mutual
exchange between native and foreign, and his account of the becoming
of Ancient Greece, in Bambach’s reading, is no different. Far from being
a pure arche then, Greece, for Ho¨lderlin, depended on a ‘positive appro-
priation of the foreign’. Ho¨lderlin, in his rejection of the hegemony of
self-appropriation, for Bambach holds much in common with what the
latter calls ‘the Jewish critique of ontology’, evinced by the likes Rosenweig,
Le´vinas, Derrida, and Celan. For these thinkers, the mutual exchange
between self and other at the heart of ancient Greece allows ‘the metaphy-
sics of totality-identity that dominates the work of Western philosophy’, or
the privileging of identity over difference, to be critiqued, as a way of over-
coming the politicised motifs of authenticity and identity at work in
Heidegger’s absolutisation of the poem.16
What Bambach sees in Ho¨lderlin is a sense of poetic dwelling which
remains open to alterity, and this is to be distinguished from Heidegger’s
absolute privileging of ‘the same’, expressed most forcefully in his lecture
on Ho¨lderlin’s ‘Andenken’, in which the other is only thought through
the proper: ‘The origin can be shown only in one way: . . . ’, Heidegger
writes, ‘ . . . returning back from a journeying which first originated from
the origin, the showing moves into a nearness to the origin. Thereby the
showing itself is pinned down in the steadfastness of the origin’.17 The
origin is left and endures throughout the journey, and the other, towards
which the poet embarks, is only thought insofar as it contributes to the
eventual becoming enacted in the subject’s return to origin and subsequent
‘fulfilment in the German homeland’.18 Bambach seeks to save Ho¨lderlin
from this narrative by highlighting the latter’s emphasis on the mutual
exchange between native and foreign, claiming that Ho¨lderlin ‘brings into
play the power of . . . Le´vinasian ethics of alterity’.19 Though Bambach is
keen to open Ho¨lderlin’s poetry up to proponents of the ‘Jewish critique
of ontology’, the latter can hardly be said to present an alternative movement
to that of Homeric homecoming, despite going some way in overcoming the
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privilege afforded to the proper via its focus on alterity for its own sake. What
Bambach is keen to present in his study is an entirely other movement,
opposed to homecoming, and bound to an overarching critique of the cen-
trality of identity to western metaphysics. To Homeric homecoming
Bambach counterposes the ‘Abrahamic myth of exile’, and this is a move-
ment in which the same moves into the other, but never returns. ‘In the
Jewish experience of wandering and exodus each finds a way of privileging
the alterity of the stranger’, Bambach writes.20 Abrahamic movement
depends upon the experience of exteriority: wandering, exodus, and exile
replace the pre-verified homeland. This displacement of homecoming
favours ‘the ethical legacy of Jerusalem’, which avoids ‘static principles’, in
opposition to ‘the ontological legacy of Athens’.21 Crucially, Bambach
reads Paul Celan in terms of this ethical legacy, emphasising the impossi-
bility of dwelling enacted in his poems. Alongside many other scholars,
Bambach reads Celan as a poet who, in relentlessly seeking alterity, stands
as an exemplar of this Abrahamic movement in exile towards the other,
against Heidegger’s compulsion to totalise in ‘coming home’.
Badiou’s anabasis is a third movement. It is couched in the same phi-
losophical terms as Homeric homecoming and Abrahamic exile – same,
other, alterity, etc. – however, it is intended to overcome both the totalis-
ing of identity tied with the former, and the privileging of the other in the
latter. Le´vinas’ conception of ethics affords primacy to the category of ‘the
Other’, and this is a move attacked vehemently by Badiou in his Ethics: An
Essay on the Understanding of Evil (1993/2001). There, Badiou modulates
Bambach’s distinction between ‘the ontological legacy of Athens’ and the
ethical legacy of Jerusalem, by claiming that Le´vinas ‘devoted his work
. . . to the deposing of philosophy in favour of ethics’.22 On Badiou’s
reading, Le´vinas is made to conflate the ontological legacy of Athens
with philosophy per se, and this is to surreptitiously exclude Le´vinas’ writ-
ings from the practice of philosophy, as well as to posit the centrality of
ontology to philosophy itself. Of course, the cornerstone of Badiou’s
mature philosophy, Being and Event (1988/2005), deems the ontological
question the necessary starting point for philosophy today.23 As it
stands, Badiou’s conception of the movement of the subject is unable to
find a place in the schemas identified so far; he at once demands ontology
be of founding importance, and that the privilege afforded to the same by
Heidegger’s conception of homecoming be rejected. In other words,
Badiou demands the conjunction of metaphysics and ethics.24
In Ethics . . . , Badiou produces a further reading of Le´vinas’ project
which anticipates the former’s departure from the two movements –
Homeric and Abrahamic – identified above:
Tom Betteridge Alain Badiou’s anabasis
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Le´vinas maintains that metaphysics, imprisoned by its Greek origins,
has subordinated thought to the logic of the Same, to the primacy of
substance and identity. But, according to Le´vinas, it is impossible to
arrive at an authentic thought of the Other (and thus an ethics of the
relation to the Other) from the despotism of the Same, which is
incapable of recognizing this Other. The dialectic of the Same and
the Other, conceived ‘ontologically’ under the dominance of self-
identity ensures the absence of the Other in effective thought, sup-
presses all genuine experience of the Other, and bars the way to an
ethical opening towards alterity.25
Heideggerian homecoming subordinates thought to the logic of the same,
harnessing the force of alterity for the benefit of the native, for what is
‘proper’. Le´vinas on the other hand (and in Bambach’s study, Celan)
seeks an ethical opening towards alterity divorced from the ontological
dominance of self-identity evinced from Parmenides to Hegel, Nietzsche,
and Heidegger. Badiou’s anabasis in contrast, is a movement desiring both
an opening towards alterity, but also the centrality of ontology. The status
of alterity in anabasis, however, is markedly different from its mobilisation
in Le´vinas. What is crucial in Badiou’s reading of Le´vinas is his assertion
that the latter reduces the ethical to the theological, ‘anulling’ the philoso-
phical in the process. Badiou’s point of contention is that in an encounter
with alterity, with the finitude of the other, there is nothing to guarantee
that such an experience is one of non-identity or of difference per se,
rather than one based on resemblance or identity – in which one recognises
oneself in the other, for example. The ethical experience on Le´vinas’
schema aims to traverse the distance between identity and non-identity,
but for Badiou the necessity of this non-identity, and of this ‘distance’
between same and other, would require a grounding principle of otherness
far beyond the finite encounter itself; in Badiou’s words, ‘The other always
resembles me too much for the hypothesis of an originary exposure to his
alterity to be necessarily true.’26 Le´vinas’s ‘Altogether-Other’ then, via the
individual subject’s ‘infinite devotion’ to it, guarantees the ‘finite devotion’
ensuring that an encounter with the other be one with otherness. Badiou
deems this infinite grounding principle another name for God, and main-
tains in his own conception of the ethical, and of the relation between same
and other, that such a figure cannot simply be suppressed; that is, the
category of ‘ethics’ cannot persist in its current ‘abstract arrangement’ –
the privileging of the other – by simply masking its dependence on an infi-
nite, unifying, or theological, figure.27
The complex relation between same and other enacted in Badiou’s
philosophy comes to light here then, for what he requires of ethics, in
order to escape the theological, is a seemingly counter-intuitive return to
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sameness or the same, which is another way of saying that ethics cannot
produce its own guiding principle (of otherness, for example, as in
Le´vinas) and instead must be tethered to the production of ‘truths’.28
The philosophical innovations made in Being and Event – that being
qua being is subtracted from knowledge and inconsistent, that ‘the one
is not’ – allow Badiou to make a return to a logic of sameness without
acquiescing to the identity-centric metaphysics with which Le´vinas takes
issue.29 For Badiou, ‘Infinite alterity is quite simply what there is.’30 The
logic of the same is modulated, referring not to a pre-verified identification
but to the intervention of unpresented inconsistency upon presented con-
sistency, sustained in the material unfolding of a truth by a subject in a situ-
ation; in Badiou’s words, ‘since differences are what there is, and since
every truth is the coming-to-be of that which is not yet, so differences
are then precisely what truths depose, or render insignificant’.31 The
figure of anabasis is to offer a subjective movement based on the philoso-
phical reconfiguration of what is understood by alterity, by the relation
between same and other. The ‘alterity’ at the centre of this movement is
really other only insofar as it is borne by an encounter with what is
effaced by ‘differences’, or the prescribed identifications of ‘the count’;
an encounter with alterity then, for Badiou, is precisely an encounter
with sameness. Badiou’s reading of ‘Anabasis’ reconfigures the position
of Celan’s poetry too then, in its relation to Heidegger, as well as to its
uncertain position in the tradition of Jewish thought, and to the early
twentieth century’s events as a whole, for the sense of the other interrogated
so forcefully by Celan comes to be invested, in Badiou’s reading, with the
results of his philosophical reformulation of identity and difference, same
and other.
Anabasis exists in opposition to Homeric homecoming and to
Abrahamic exile, though in Badiou’s reading of Xenophon, this opposition
is not easily discerned. In his initial invocation of both ‘re-ascent towards
the source’ and ‘exiled experience of beginning’, Badiou invites consonance
with the two movements from which his own departs. In Xenophon’s nar-
rative, he and his 10,000 Greek mercenary troops are left abandoned in
foreign lands following the death of their Persian employer at Cunaxa.
Badiou further complicates the status of anabasis in relation to homecom-
ing by insisting that the former names the mercenaries’ movement ‘home-
ward’: ‘ . . . left alone in the heart of an unknown country, bereft of any
local support or pre-established destination. “Anabasis” will be the name
for their “homeward” movement, the movement of lost men, out of
place and outside the law’.32 Modulating the initial three meanings com-
prising anabasis, Badiou proceeds to invest anabasis with, firstly, a ‘prin-
ciple of lostness’, in this case determined by the mercenaries being
‘deprived of any reason for being where they are’ (their essential foreignness
Tom Betteridge Alain Badiou’s anabasis
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in Persia), secondly, with the necessity of invention – they are ‘ . . . left to
their own devices, forced . . . to invent their own destiny’ – and finally,
with the imperative to find something new, for anabasis ‘invents a path
without knowing whether it really is the path of return’.33
However, nothing so far testifies to the core of anabasis; a movement
that, embarking into the unknown from an empty space, demands disci-
plined progression, step by step, carving a trajectory from nothing – the
‘free invention of a wandering that will have been a return’.34 The
essence of anabasis, which sets it apart from both homecoming and
exile, is its progression through undecidability.35 In Badiou’s words:
In the trajectory it names, anabasis leaves undecided the parts
respectively allotted to disciplined invention and uncertain wander-
ing. In so doing, it constitutes a disjunctive synthesis of will and wan-
dering. After all the Greek word already attests to this undecidability,
since the verb anaban1in [(anabanein)] (‘to anabase’, as it were)
means both ‘to embark’ and ‘to return’. There is no doubt that
this semantic pairing suits a century that ceaselessly asks itself
whether it is an end or a beginning.36
Anabasis demands disciplined, formal innovation alongside uncertainty.
Discipline ensures the progressive movement through the uncertain and
unknown, but also its restraint. Wandering is restrained by will, yet wan-
dering must intervene on restraint producing momentum. Badiou’s inten-
tion in the passage above is to bring anabasis into dialogue with what he
elsewhere calls ‘thought’.37 Like thought, the tension internal to anabasis
is what propels its movement: there is no external verification (it is
‘outside the law’), no ‘homeland’ via which it can orientate itself, and no
predetermined, pre-verified space from which to embark. ‘Will’, the
desire of a subject body, is subjected to formal discipline, but this
subject must also wander in the unknown, avoiding the Kantian prescrip-
tion of an a priori ‘moral’ law determining ethical action. For Peter
Hallward, ‘nothing is more foreign to [Badiou’s] notion of the subject
than the idea of a will governed by purely a priori principles’.38 It is pre-
cisely in the blank open spaces beyond the reaches of the law, of structure
or of rules that the subject must wander in order to win reality, or in order
to sustain the material unfolding of truth within a world. In the language of
Badiou’s main influence on the question of ethics – Lacan – we could say
that it is only by subtracting away from the prescriptions of the symbolic
order in which we submit to our identification that we might approach
the real, and, as Hallward suggests, ‘ethics’ is what allows the subjective
encounter with this real to be sustained – this is the ‘disciplined invention’
of anabasis.39
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Before investigating Badiou’s treatment of alterity in Celan’s ‘Anaba-
sis’, I want to explore how Celan himself engages with the movement of
homecoming by close-reading his poem ‘Heimkehr’ – ‘Homecoming’.
In Celan’s poem, the efficacy of the poetic word in both inauguration
and the return to what is proper – one’s ‘own’ – is placed under strain
both by the elision of the homeland itself, and by the radical reduction
or deletion of the assured wholeness of the poetic voice. The ‘I’, left floating
and empty in the wake of its evacuation, is rendered latent and mute, but is
charged nonetheless with the poetic imperative to trace an alternative
movement. For Celan, famously, ‘Poems . . . are a kind of homecoming’,
but the trajectory this imperative for the poem demands stands in stark
opposition to homecoming in its Ho¨lderlinian and Heideggerian forms.
Reading ‘Homecoming’ also anticipates the close-reading of Celan’s
‘Anabasis’ with which this essay concludes, by encouraging us to think
the concept of anabasis as a movement built upon the armature of a
negated homecoming.
Reading Celan’s ‘Homecoming’
Paul Celan’s 1955 poem ‘Heimkehr’ (‘Homecoming’) is from his third
collection Sprachgitter (Language Mesh). ‘Homecoming’ also names
Michael Hamburger’s translation of Ho¨lderlin’s ‘Heimkunft’ from the
turn of the nineteenth century.40 In their difference, these titles serve to
unfold a fundamental contrast in tone and emphasis between the two
poems.
Heimkehr is Celan’s title. Its meaning in everyday German – home-
coming, or the return home – is lent poetic nuance by its suffix’s derivation
from the verb kehren (‘to turn’ in English) and its distance from the verb
kommen (to come).41 To make ‘turning’ resonate beneath ‘coming’ in
this way is to offer an understanding of homecoming in which completion
is deferred; ‘home’, whatever or wherever that may be, is turned towards,
not found and returned to. Beneath ‘Heimkehr’ then, operates a privilege
afforded to embarking rather than returning itself. In idiomatic German,
the verb kehrer is also used to evoke an introspective pensiveness – in
sich gekehrt – or an introspective person more generally – ein in sich gekehr-
ter Mensch.42 Any turning towards home, for this poem, is tethered to a
subject in a self-reflexive, interrogative mode, and the choice of kehrer in
this case also serves to make sure that any questioning of the outside –
borders, boundaries, territory, homeland – is imbricated with the internal
dynamics of the individual subject. Finally, kehren is also the German verb
for ‘to sweep’. Imbuing Celan’s title with a distant sense of clearing, kehren
evokes both the flattened features of an unidentifiable home or homeland
Tom Betteridge Alain Badiou’s anabasis
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and the historical caesura understood by the signifier ‘Auschwitz’,43 but
also the promise of marking out a journey upon an empty, pure space.
In contrast, Ho¨lderlin’s title, ‘Heimkunft’, harnesses the verb kommen
in its suffix -kunft. This word-choice changes little of the immediate sense
in German, for which -kunft operates to denote ‘come’ in conjunction with
other prefixes, for example in Ankunft – ‘arrivals’.44 Harnessed poetically,
however, it offers consonance with ku¨nftig, an adjective denoting ‘future’.
In Ho¨lderlin’s title then, we are invited to think the ‘futurehome’ to which
we shall return, and this is to imbue the homeland with a sense of prior
verification or guarantee. Ho¨lderlin’s dedication of the poem ‘to his rela-
tives’ (an die Verwandten) only serves to consolidate this construction of
homecoming which privileges a return, in the future, to origins, to place
of birth, but also to abiding structures of familial support. The contrast
with Celan’s ‘Homecoming’ becomes sharply focused here if we accept
John Felstiner’s reading that the ‘you’ of Celan’s poem is an address to
his mother, shot in the Autumn of 1942.45 Celan’s ‘Homecoming’
begins from a wholesale evacuation of those preconfigured, identifiable
structures towards which Ho¨lderlin seeks a return.
If there is a negative encounter with lost home in Celan, however,
there is also a positive one, to which the final minutes of Celan’s ‘The Mer-
idian’ speech, made on reception of the Georg Bu¨chner Prize in 1960,
attest. Homecoming, its Ho¨lderlinian form subverted and supplanted, is
conceived instead as a movement vitalised by an encounter between an
‘I’ and a ‘You’, ‘encounters, paths from a voice to a listening You,
natural paths, outlines for existence perhaps, for projecting ourselves into
the search for ourselves . . . A kind of homecoming’.46 But, this is a home-
coming in which the given is uncertain and unfixed, in which there is no
Swabian motherland, for example, to return to. Celan, in a reply to a book-
store questionnaire, describes the relation between ‘reality’ and poetic
language two years earlier as follows:
This language, notwithstanding its inalienable complexity of
expression, is concerned with precision. It does not transfigure or
render ‘poetical’; it names, it posits, it tries to measure the area of
the given and the possible. True, this is never the working of
language itself, language as such, but always of an ‘I’ who speaks
from the particular angle of reflection which is his existence and
who is concerned with outlines and orientation. Reality is not
simply there, it must be searched and won.47
Against mythical poetic rendering or transfiguration (muthos), Celan’s
poetics compels the poem to measure with precision, to carve out a path
through a featureless terrain in which nothing is given.48 The poet is
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charged with the painstaking construction and measurement of a reality
which resists language. This is a feature of Celan’s poetics which helps
us to understand not only the subversion of Ho¨lderlinian homecoming
in his work, but also, in this subversion, the constitution of an entirely
new trajectory within and without the realms of the poem, a movement
which corresponds to Badiou’s ‘anabasis’.
That reality must be sought and won, as Celan says, is a demand to
which his ‘Homecoming’ remains faithful. Its taut, self-sufficient strophes
restrain and encapsulate dynamic, often contradictory, movements
between speaker and ‘home’ which develop across the poem’s five steps.
In Michael Hamburger’s translation, the poem reads as follows:
HOMECOMING
Snowfall, denser and denser,
dove-coloured as yesterday,
snowfall, as if even now you were sleeping.
White, stacked into distance.
Above it, endless,
the sleigh track of the lost.
Below, hidden,
presses up
what so hurts the eyes,
hill upon hill,
invisible.
On each
fetched home into its today,
an I slipped away into dumbness:
wooden, a post.
There a feeling,
blown across by the ice wind
attaching its dove – its snow –
coloured cloth as a flag.
HEIMKEHR
Schneefall, dichter und dichter,
taubenfarben, wie gestern,
Schneefall, als schliefst du auch jetzt noch.
Weithin, gelagertes Weiß.
Dru¨berhin, endlos,
die Schlittenspur des Verlornen.
Tom Betteridge Alain Badiou’s anabasis
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Darunter, geborgen,
stu¨lpt sich empor,
was den Augen so weh tut,
Hu¨gel um Hu¨gel,
unsichtbar.
Auf jedem,
heimgeholt in sein Heute,
ein ins Stumme entglittenes Ich:
ho¨lzern, ein Pflock.
Dort: ein Gefu¨hl,
vom Eiswind heru¨bergeweht,
das sein tauben-, sein schnee-
farbenes Fahnentuch festmacht.49
Snow effaces history and asserts a boundless, empty present – ‘now’. Both
‘as yesterday’ and ‘stacked into distance’, snow homogenises memory and
destination. Subtle communication with Ho¨lderlin’s poem ‘Heimkunft’ is
present here too, for ‘Snowfall’ is a mark of resistance against Ho¨lderlin’s
naming of ‘the Alps’ (‘Drinn in den Alpen . . . ’) in the first line of his own
‘Homecoming’.50 This lack of coordinates in Celan’s poem is lent sense
and further evolved in prosody: the promise in the break between strophes
is crushed by a terse reassertion of the snow’s hegemony – ‘White, stacked
into distance’. This is the only point in the poem at which a sentence inter-
venes on a strophe, although the chiastic contribution of the line in
German – ‘Weithin gelagertes Weib’, where ‘Weib’ completes and reca-
pitulates ‘Schneefall’ – is lost in the English; ‘distance’ fails to reproduce
the closed quality of the first four lines and the break between them, invit-
ing us to roll through the full stop into ‘Above’ without sufficient pause.
Regardless, the endless whiteness of the snow does not connote the
freedom of boundlessness, so much as entrapment, the difficulty of move-
ment forwards or backwards, in a time and space whose coordinates have
been effaced.
However, the very density of the ‘stacked’ snow also harbours a posi-
tive assertion of poetic task. As a poem in communication with Heidegger’s
mobilisation of Ho¨lderlin’s homecoming, this is precisely a demand for
movement. John Felstiner is keen to emphasise the pun which operates
beneath ‘denser’: ‘dichter und dichter’, he writes, ‘suggests the concentrate
of poems, since Dichter also means “poet”’.51 The first strophe makes
‘Snowfall’ the surface on which the poet must embark, and extends this fea-
tureless terrain into both past and future; it becomes the only space from
which movement, in poetry, may begin. However, this imperative for
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poetry is nuanced by the elevation of ‘snow’ as a metaphor for the medium
in which poetic thought is produced; ‘dichter und dichter’ falls the snow,
muffling eloquence, but not mute. ‘Homecoming’ begins then from a site
of contradiction. ‘Snowfall’ indexes both negative ground and the poetic
capacity to explore routes forward, but the first strophe alone is not
enough to allow us to separate one from the other; they remain indiscern-
ible. The imperative for ‘Homecoming’ is to submit this indiscernibility to
direction, to carve out a path, but without the benefit of external
verification.
For Celan, ‘poems are en route: they are headed toward’.52 ‘Home-
coming’ is a poem which asks what this ‘en route’ consists of, what it is
headed towards, and it does this by elaborating a principle of measurement
that steadily submits an empty landscape to orientation. At first, an open,
empty surface is only submitted to measurement by the ‘sleigh track of the
lost’ which extends above the drifts ‘as yesterday’, its ‘endless’ extension
reaching beyond the horizon. This sleigh track submits the terrain to
measure insofar as it produces a point of orientation with which to navi-
gate. ‘Dru¨berhin’ – ‘Above it’ – offers little scope for conceiving the
sleigh-track as inscribed in the snow, measuring the terrain with its
furrow. The trace is far more distant, a constellation in a dim night sky
perhaps, for the setting of Celan’s poem, following Ho¨lderlin, is surely per-
petual twilight.
The first strophe of Ho¨lderlin’s ‘Homecoming’ invokes a landscape, a
‘Chaos trembling with pleasure’ in ecstatic anticipation for the coming
dawn – ‘a gleaming night still delays . . . [ . . . ] . . . For more bacchantically
now morning approaches within’.53 The snow of the Alps is divinely
blessed. In Ho¨lderlin’s second strophe, dawn, ‘rosy-fingered’ as in
Homer’s epithet, brings the light of the sun – ‘Full of roses up there,
flushed with dawn’s rays, lies the snow’.54 Above the snow for Ho¨lderlin,
not the trace of loss, but the dwelling of a God made glad by the play of
‘holy’ sun beams on snow-capped mountains below; ‘so now does life
bud anew’ in a tumult of ‘well-allotted fortune’, tumbling over fifteen
lines of unbroken dactylic hexameter. But in Celan’s poem, this dawn
never arrives. The ‘sleigh track of the lost’, inscribed on the abyss of the
sky above the snow, supplants Ho¨lderlin’s God and the warming sun,
and the ‘joyful zest’ and abundance of hexameter is evacuated and pared
down into isolated, one-sentence strophes like stepping stones.55 Enjamb-
ment is conspicuous by its near-complete absence in Celan’s poem: often
utilised by Celan as a key constituent of a prosody that carves and cuts, its
absence here suggests a reduction not a fragmentation of Ho¨lderlin’s lines,
a withdrawal from eloquent excess which is recognisable finally in the
reduction of Ho¨lderlin’s six strophe ‘Homecoming’, to Celan’s five.
In turn, each compact, pared-down strophe in Celan’s poem testifies to
Tom Betteridge Alain Badiou’s anabasis
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a principle of poetic measurement which proceeds point by point through
difficulty.
The measure of boundlessness in the second strophe – the sleigh track
‘Above’ – is supplemented in the third once ‘hill upon hill’ become fea-
tures of the terrain. The endlessness of the trace in the sky is concretised
and made particular in the features of the landscape below. Eyes strain
in an effort to discern the emergence of mounds of snow on a backdrop
of ‘White’. These hills make the minute transition from being ‘hidden’
‘below’ to pressing up, ‘invisible’, inscribing landmarks on the surface,
but marks only present insofar as they are felt in the eye they make
blind. ‘What so hurts the eyes’ is precisely their inability to discern these
mounds, these graves. The poem’s measurements at this stage allow an
empty territory to be discerned through its bifurcation from the sky
above, but also through its own inherent, though invisible, features.
Each strophe takes a minute step forwards in constructing a ‘home’, but
the features which construct this home – the sleigh track and the hills,
so far – are both qualified in a way that makes their appearance ephemeral
or fleeting. The sleigh track’s endlessness threatens its efficacy as a point of
differentiation, and the hills, though they ‘press up’ and are felt, ultimately
resist our grasp in the final line of the strophe – they are ‘invisible’.
This fragility in construction reaches its apex in the fourth strophe,
which offers the most tautly-woven, dialectical image in the poem. The
appearance of the ‘I’ here harbours much of this strophe’s ambiguity, by
indexing both the representation of each grave’s inhabitant and the singular
lyric ‘I’ on the page. The form works hard to ensure that the strophe’s orig-
inal assertion of plurality – ‘On each’ – is reduced, filtered, through the
appearance of the ‘I’, in order to become resolutely singular, transformed
following the colon into ‘a post’. Both instances of the I are ‘fetched
home into [their] today’. The lost – or ‘other’, in a visceral rejection of
Heidegger’s mobilisation of homecoming – find their ‘home’ in graves,
each grave marked by the slipping away of the inhabitant to which it
belongs, each metamorphosing into a readable wooden graphic or dead
letter at the same time made resolutely singular by its material placement
– ‘I’ – in the text. ‘Today’ forces a conjunction between a lost other unable
to speak, and a lyric I struck dumb.
However, the movement from ‘wooden’ to ‘post’,56 the most impor-
tant transition in the poem, and the apex of its dialectical development,
bears evidence of a latent subjectivity able to open up, through silence, a
seemingly dead object, or ‘mere thing’ in Heidegger’s words. The
wooden marker on each of these hills is transfigured into a ‘post’. No
longer wooden or dead, as ‘posts’ the grave markers are able to commem-
orate the lost. The expression of this minimal transition cut off by a colon
– ‘wooden, a post’ – is this strophe’s principle of measurement. This is the
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first instance in Celan’s poem in which measurement demands human
agency, for a wooden ‘mere thing’ cannot become a ‘post’ on its own,
but must be raised and planted. Not only is there a principle of measure-
ment at work here insofar as mere things are made commemoratives, posts
also mark boundaries. The space upon which poetry embarks is not the
motherland but the silence of loss. The posts serve to measure the bound-
aries of that territory which the ‘I’ who speaks, in Celan’s words, seeks to
bring into relief. But the strophe finishes with only one post: the path dic-
tated by the poem is a laborious one with only fragile results.
The final strophe serves to consolidate the measurement undertaken
by the poetic voice, and it reconciles this poetic task with homeland.
For, not only does the post serve to mark out a territory determined by
loss, affect – ‘a feeling’ – also consolidates this marking by attaching its
flag. What we are left with at the poem’s conclusion is a lone post-
become-flagpole, serving to mark a territory with no features. The ice
wind which attaches this flag also threatens to bring more snowfall
with it. The assertion of this territory, arduously constructed, results
only in precarity, as the snowfall – poetry’s saying – is transported by
the same wind attaching the flag, yet also threatens to obscure it, to say
too much. By way of contrast, the final strophe of Ho¨lderlin’s ‘Homecom-
ing’ bemoans the silence that often befalls everyday speech, elevating lyrical
poetry by ascribing it the task of bringing the transcendent into proximity:
Silence often behoves us: deficient in names that are holy,
Hearts may beat high, while the lips hesitate, wary of speech?
Yet a lyre to each hour lends the right mode, the right music,
And, it may be, delights heavenly ones who draw near.57
Poetry’s capacity to name the holy in times of joy is bound by an ostensibly
political imperative here. That the lyre provide the ‘right music’ in the
‘right mode’ is a direct reference to Plato’s The Republic in which the pol-
itical founding of the new state excludes all instruments besides the lyre and
the cithara, and forbids music played in modes besides the Dorian and the
Phrygian.58 This dialogue with Plato serves to imbue the inauguration
tasked to poetic homecoming in Ho¨lderlin with a principle of political
state-forming; the arrival home – home’s verification – and the
winning of the gods’ proximity, are coterminous with the eventual exclu-
sion of the other. This is the sense of homecoming against which Celan
poses his own. In a historical situation that renders poetry qua founding-
word obscene, the trajectory his poem charts is one of minimal, precise
steps towards something fragile and ephemeral, a movement determined
by the cut of language, ‘Toward something open, inhabitable, an
approachable you, perhaps, an approachable reality’.59
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Reading Celan’s ‘Anabasis’
The question of ‘an approachable you’ and its proximity in Celan’s speech
to ‘an approachable reality’ is precisely what is at stake in anabasis. In The
Century, Badiou reads Michael Hamburger’s translation of Celan’s ‘Anaba-
sis’ from Die Niemandsrose (1963).60 Taking its point of departure in the
difficulty of movement faced by language in its approach towards the
other, conceived both as the lost and as ‘reality’, ‘Anabasis’, for Badiou,
reveals the crucial importance of the encounter to how we must conceive
any movement of the subject seeking to overcome the nefarious complici-
ties implicit within homecoming.
ANABASIS
This
narrow sign between walls
the impassable-true
Upward and Back
to the heart-bright future.
There.
Syllable-
mole, sea-
coloured, far out
into the unnavigated.
Then:
buoys,
espalier of sorrow-buoys,
with those
breath reflexes leaping and
lovely for seconds only-: light-
bellsounds (dum-,
dun-, un-,
unde suspirat
cor),
re-
leased, re-
deemed, ours.
Visible, audible thing, the
tent-
word growing free:
Together.
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ANABASIS
Dieses
schmal zwishhen Mauren geschriebne
unwegsam-wahre
Hinauf und Zu¨ruck
in die herzhelle Zukunft.
Dort.
Silben-
mole, meer-
farben, weit
ins Unbefahrne hinaus.
Dann:
Bojen-,
Kummerbojen-Spalier
mit den
sekundenscho¨n hu¨pfenden
Atemreflexen-: Leucht-
glockento¨ne (dum-,
dun-, un-,
unde suspirat
cor),
aus-
gelo¨st, ein-
gelo¨st, unser.
Sichtbares, Ho¨rbares, das
frei-
werdende Zeltwort:
Mitsammen.
The three initial components of anabasis in Xenophon – ‘re-ascent
towards the source’, ‘arduous construction of novelty’, and ‘exiled experi-
ence of beginning’61 – are modulated in Celan’s poem, becoming for
Badiou, ‘three fragile and almost improbable connections: “narrow
sign”, “impassable-true”, “to the heart-bright future”’.62 Together these
connections comprise the ‘Upward and Back’, the movement of Celan’s
anabasis. The inner workings of this important first strophe reveal much
about the precise nature of these ‘connections’. The poem begins with
the word Dieses – ‘This’ here and now. Hamburger chooses to elevate
the present of the poem itself, casting it as the ‘narrow sign’, though the
Tom Betteridge Alain Badiou’s anabasis
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German glosses more literally as ‘written narrow between walls’. The
poem’s language is condensed into a single ‘sign’ restrained by the walls
surrounding it. Zwischen usually translates as ‘between’ but also suffixes
Zwischenbemerkung and Zwischenruf, to mean ‘interruption’, a sense
which is understandably lost in English. The narrow sign, seemingly con-
strained and reduced, offers itself nonetheless as an interruption to the
limits the walls impose, and a route along which the ‘heart-bright future’
may be sought.
This first strophe hinges on a pun on weg – German for path. Unweg-
sam denotes ‘rough’ in English but Hamburger is alert to the negation of
weg in unweg, glossing unwegsam-wahre as something like ‘the rough and
unpathed true’, hence his translation ‘impassable-true’. Of course, in the
German, the fact that any path in the poem is obscured in paronomasia
invites us to consider the difficulty of the path, the fact that the route
via which anabasis must proceed is not given to us. For Badiou, ‘to the
degree that [the path] is true, it is impassable’.63 Language constrained
between the walls is impassable insofar as it is true, but is also unpathed
by the Shoah; language is the only means of continuing, but it must be
a resistant language, a ‘narrow sign’.
In The Century, Badiou begins his reading of ‘Anabasis’ by removing
questions of the other from the bounds of collectivity, from the dialectic of
the ‘I’ and the ‘we’. The ground upon which thinking through the other
must take place shifts on ‘the other side of the century’ – after the
Holocaust – from the violent assertion of identity and an adversarial or
appropriative treatment of the other towards, instead, a situation in
which only the ‘imperceptible poverty of the call’ of the other may be
heard.64 In Celan’s poem, silence intervenes on the ‘I’ and the ‘we’, deni-
grating their self-sufficiency; all that is left is an unidentified voice, and the
movement of the poem is its trace. ‘To the question “Who speaks?”, the
poem answers: “No one”’, Badiou writes, ‘There is just a voice, an anon-
ymous voice the poem tunes into.’65
However, this voice on its own is not enough to journey ‘Upwards
and Back’. The crucial insight Badiou develops in dialogue with Celan’s
poem, is that the undecidability of wandering and will in any anabasis
requires an encounter in order to proceed. In Celan’s anabasis, this encoun-
ter is with the buoys’ ephemeral ‘bellsounds’ – for Badiou, the sounds
emitted by beacons heralding the retraction of the tide – this is an
image of the ‘poverty of the call’ of the other. Celan’s poem evolves its
‘Upward and Back’ through this image of the beacons as they leave a
trace of a Mozart motet – unde suspirat cor – on the air, which Badiou qua-
lifies further as ‘the minimal difference of the breath of the other’.66 The
‘voice trying to trace a way’ in a movement of anabasis, requires this
breath be met: ‘Assuming the call – its enigma –’, Badiou writes,
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‘Celan breaks with the theme of an empty and self-sufficient wandering.
Something must be encountered.’67 The poem works ‘Upward’ to the mar-
itime call, before its ‘Return’ to the walls from which it embarks, for the last
word of the fifth strophe ‘Zeltwort’, ‘tent-word’, recalls the first’s last word
‘Zukunft’ – ‘future’ – but supplements it too with the finality of Mitsam-
men – ‘Together’.
It is on this encounter that the word ‘Together’, the projected future of
the journey, depends: ‘There is a pure call’, Badiou writes, ‘an almost imper-
ceptible difference that must be made our own, simply because we have
encountered it.’68 Celan’s question, in Badiou’s words, is ‘How are we to
make alterity ours?’69 This is to ask how we may bear the consequences of
an encounter with ‘minimal difference’ without eliding that difference
itself – passing it over – or subsuming it under a pre-verified subjective
figure. This difference – the call – is constitutive for the subject, but the
subject only persists so long as this difference is harboured: ‘The “we”
enjoys an aleatory dependence on an anabasis that reascends – outside of
any pre-existing path – towards this “together” that still harbours alterity.’70
The interaction between same and other does not occur at the level of iden-
tity or representation as in homecoming then, but at the level of precarious
presentation, the ‘tremulous uncertainty’ of alterity, ours, and ‘together’.
Badiou’s reading is intended to dispel the idealist conceit of a pre-
existing subjective substance through which difference is encountered
and then internalised or appropriated as one’s own. Broadly speaking,
this is idealist insofar as it reconciles encounters with difference within a
pre-existing subject. Badiou’s rigorous materialism is grounded in his con-
viction that the subject is never similarly pre-existing, but constructed as
the material support in each and every unfolding of a truth within a situ-
ation; far from guaranteeing unity, or a way of overcoming what Badiou
calls the ‘aporias of the One’, Badiou’s subject is dependent on an encoun-
ter with an event – this call of the other.71 For Badiou’s purposes then, it
seems important that the encounter with the fleeting ‘breath of the other’ is
rendered within the image-world of Celan’s poem as a material
supplement – the ‘espalier of sorrow-buoys’. The sorrow-buoys’ ‘espalier’
refigures the walls of the first strophe as climbable trellises, which are then
supplemented by the ‘tent-/word’ becoming visible, ‘growing free’ up the
walls. The espalier serves to ornament the material of the poem too, man-
ifesting itself in the prosody’s prunes and cuts, and the ornate punctuation
and italics of the strophe in which it appears. Only following the immedi-
ate assertion of a material difference – no longer walls, but ‘espalier’ – is
the call of the bellsounds itself understood as such, as if the encounter
forces an immediate material shift in the possibilities of this world, even
before a subject is able to coagulate around it in order to make those pos-
sibilities real.
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Earlier in The Century, Badiou makes explicit the nefarious complici-
ties accompanying those movements of the subject – like Heideggerian
homecoming – that privilege pre-verified, given ideals, movements that
subsume the other under the drive for authenticity:
For a whole host of thinkers, particularly in the area of fascist thought
(and without excepting Heidegger), ‘the new man’ is in part the res-
titution of the man of old, of the man who had been eradicated, had
disappeared, had been corrupted. Purification is actually the more or
less violent process of a return of vanished origin. The new is a pro-
duction of authenticity. In the final analysis, the task of the century is
viewed here as restitution (of the origin) through destruction (of the
inauthentic).72
Under the sign of ‘anabasis’, Badiou finds the resources to think through
the formation, following an encounter, of an ephemeral subject consist-
ently uncertain of itself – ‘a “we” that does not pretend to be a
subject’.73 It is the intensity with which Celan’s poems respond to the
dynamics of identification evinced in Heidegger’s reading of Ho¨lderlin
which elevates them as conditions for Badiou’s philosophy. In the wake
of twentieth-century violence, the subject is not to be thought in terms
of identification, but as something arising only after an encounter – an
event. The process that guides the subject’s formation then is similarly
opposed to the identifications that pre-exist such an encounter.
Though elsewhere in The Century Badiou is resolute in his distinction
between Fascist and Communist subjectivities and their respective politics –
the latter, importantly, experiences ‘the antimony . . . between the finitude of
the state and the infinite immanent to every truth, including and above all
political truth’74 – they nonetheless both mobilise ‘the production of ima-
ginary macroscopic entities and hyperbolic names’, which serves, in the par-
ticular case of the ‘communisms’, to stultify truth’s immanence by
subsuming it under an objective historical category – ‘the proletariat’, ‘the
people’ or ‘the nation’.75 The contemporary force of Celan’s anabasis for
Badiou then, arises not only in its rejection of Heideggerian homecoming
– its demythologisation of the process of subject formation, the clearance
of ideals and pre-verified mythical/cultural categories by which a subject
orients itself – but also insofar as it offers a movement of the subject that
resists, at a later stage, submission to the inert ‘communist’ categories of ‘pro-
letariat’, etc., prevalent in and deemed necessary by the century’s emancipa-
tory political projects. For Badiou, Celan overcomes Heideggerian
homecoming by presenting a process of subject formation which avoids
requiring the other’s effacement or extermination, but he also anticipates
the necessity of reconfiguring twentieth-century subjective movements so
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that they are able to coalesce around an event and sustain its thought via an
inner dynamism, refusing the external verification of supposedly universal
ideals: in Badiou’s words, Celan’s anabasis offers ‘a “we” that would not
be prey to the ideal of the fusional, quasi-military “I” that dominated the
century’s adventure; a “we” that would freely convey its own immanent dis-
parity without thereby dissolving itself’.76 ‘Anabasis’ is the trajectory of a
subject that sustains this dynamism as an interruption: it seeks the rejection
of mythical/cultural ideals in subject formation, a non-adversarial approach
to the other (which, for Badiou, must be an encounter with alterity bound to
‘the Same’ – the event), and the avoidance of any attempt to represent the
real movement of event and subject or pass over the force of radically discon-
tinuous, material unfolding of truths to ‘fictional objectivities’.77
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